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Abstract. Social choice is the theory about collective decision towards
social welfare starting from individual opinions, preferences, interests or
welfare. The field of Computational Social Welfare is somewhat recent
and it is gaining impact in the Artificial Intelligence community. Classical
literature makes the assumption of single-peaked preferences, i.e. there
exist a linear order in the preferences and there is a global maximum in
this order. Recently, some theoretical results were published about Two-
stage Approval Voting Systems (TAVs), Multi-winner Selection Rules
(MWSR) and Incomplete (IPs) and Circular Preferences (CPs) that I
claim leads to research about Preferences Graphs and Preferences Multi-
dimensional Functions in Polynomial time.
The purpose of this paper is three-fold: Firstly, I want to introduce Social
Choice Optimisation as a generalisation of TAVs where there is a maxi-
mization stage and a minimization stage implementing thus a Minimax,
a well-known Artificial Intelligence decision-making rule to minimize hin-
dering towards a (Social) Goal. Secondly, I want to introduce, following
my Open Standardization and Open Integration Theory (in refinement
process) put in practice in my dissertation, the Open Standardization of
Social Inclusion, as a global social goal of Social Choice Optimization.
1 Motivation
Social choice is the theory about collective decision towards social welfare start-
ing from individual opinions, preferences, interests or welfare. The field of Com-
putational Social Welfare is somewhat recent and it is gaining impact in the
Artificial Intelligence community. Classical literature makes the assumption of
single-peaked preferences, i.e. there exist a linear order in the preferences and
there is a global maximum in this order. Recently some theoretical results were
published about Two-stage Approval Voting Systems (TAVs), Multi-winner Se-
lection Rules (MWSR) and Incomplete (IPs) and Circular Preferences (CPs)
that I claim leads to research about Preferences Graphs and Preferences Multi-
dimensional Functions in Polynomial time.
The purpose of this paper is three-fold: Firstly, I want to introduce Social
Choice Optimisation as a generalisation of TAVs where there is a maximization
stage and a mininimization stage implementing thus a Minimax, a well-known
Artificial Intelligence decision-making rule to minimize hindering towards a (So-
cial) Goal. Secondly, I want to introduce, following my Open Standardization
and Open Integration Theory (in refinement process) put in practice in my dis-
sertation [1], the Open Standardization of Social Inclusion, as a global social
goal of Social Choice Optimization.
As for the Open Standardization of Social Inclusion, I will start with a open
consensus between Adaptive Coordinate descent and Coherence Theory, extend-
ing the propositional evaluation of the latter for the multi-variate functional case.
Then I will continue towards an open integration of both approaches introduc-
ing the Coherent Social Inclusion Problem. Finally, I will provide an algorithm
for the One-stage Approval Voting (OAV) and two for the Two-stage Approval
Voting (TAV), namely, Preference Number Maximization (PNM) and Preference
Aggregation (PA). PNM is useful for tackling the overall known problem, but is
NP-hard in the uncertain case as it is a generalisation of the Travelling Sales-
man Problem for continuous Halmiltonian Paths. Let me argue this statement.
Adaptive Coordinate Descent is a generalisation of Gradient Descent which in
turn it is a generalisation of Hill Climbing.
That is my point, imagine that you and some other strangers got kidnapped
and left unconscious in the middle of a mountain. Let also assume, that you want
to reach a peak to see where are you in order to continue with the escape plan.
(Rolling downwards is obviously disregarded). In that case, you might want to
follow the most gradual and feasible path minimising the distance walked too.
Having a bit of knowledge of the mentioned mountain or having a map would
equal to finding the gradual shortest path. However, without any knowledge
of the mountain, only with an intuition about the goal, you and your luckily
friendly partners should arrive to a consensus about the paths to follow at any
bifurcation. One heuristic would be to analyse a subset of all the possible paths,
choose the k-gradual and feasible paths and vote the final solution. That would
be Coherent Social Inclusion.
The structure of this paper is as follow: Section 2.1 introduces the field and
latest research results on Social Choice. A generalization of Coherence Theory is
introduced in section 2.2. The first approach presented in this paper is Two-stage
Approval Voting Optimization and it is enunciated in section 3.1. Secondly, the
minimization of Discriminating Preferences is introduced in section 3.2. Thirdly,
the overall process, namely, Coherent Social Inclusion is presented in section 4.
2 Context
2.1 Social Choice
Social choice is the theory about collective decision towards social welfare start-
ing from individual opinions, preferences, interests or welfare. The field of Com-
putational Social Welfare is somewhat recent and it is gaining impact in the
Artificial Intelligence Community. Classical literature makes the assumption of
single-peaked preferences, i.e. there exist a linear order in the preferences and
there is a global maximum in this order. Recently some theoretical and poly-
nomial time results were published about Two-stage Approval Voting Systems
(TAVs), Multi-winner Selection Rules (MWSR) [2] and Incomplete (IPs) [3] and
Circular Preferences (CPs) [4] that I claim leads to research about Preferences
Graphs and Preferences Multi-dimensional Functions in Polynomial time.
Two-stage Approval Voting Approval Voting (AV) is a single-winner elec-
toral system where each voter may select k-candidates. The winner is the most-
approved candidate. There are extensions for the selection of j-winners using
Multi-winner Selection Rules (MWSR) in Proportional Approval Voting [2].
Two-stage Approval Voting (TAV) is a refinement of AV, where the global
Selection Rule is divided into two selection rules that narrows the group of
candidates passing to the next stage.
2.2 Coherence Theory
Thagard proposed a decision-making Theory of Coherence about a graph of
atomic propositional preferences with a computational coherence function that
it is modified when newer preferences are added [5].
3 Preliminary Proposals
The author proposes to specify Coherence Theory with a multi-dimensional Co-
herence function is each edge of the Graph.
3.1 Optimizing Two-stage Approval Voting
Following the classical approach to TAVs, the MWSR selects the k-winners with
the most votes in both stages. On the contrary, the Author proposes first a
maximisation (most positive votes) stage and then a minimisation (less negative
votes) stage. Thus, applying the Minimax Condorcet Method for the optimisa-
tion of Social Choice.
3.2 Discriminating Preferences Minimization
Taking from granted Social Inclusion as the global goal of Social Choice Op-
timization, the author defines Social Discrimination as the inverse of a multi-
dimensional Utility function representing the Social Inclusion of an agent in a
Society.
As for minimization, Adaptive Coordinate Descent[6] is a Gradient Descent
generalisation for optimization of non-derivable functions, as the Social Discrim-
ination functions.
Declarative Electronic Institutions may Discriminate Any type of con-
straint in the Social Universe (either physical, social, normative, moral, ethic,
etc.) are implicitly generalized in the Social Discrimination function.
For example, the author envisages several Social Discrimination axis, namely,
the agreed (physical, social, normative, moral, ethic. . .) categories leading ex-
clusion and discrimination risk, e.g age (range), gender, ethnicity,. . . ,negative
permissions, prohibitions, obligations, duties, power and so on.
In the following applied example I will use Declarative Mechanism Design
[7]:
DEIt : Eventst ×Rulest × InstEventst−1 → InstEventst+1
A Declarative Electronic Institution calculates the aggregation and removal
of agreed events (InstEvents) for a set of previous InstEvents (possibly empty),
a set of Rules and a set of Events.
Using Social Discrimination definition it would be defined as follows:
DEIt =
−→
SD : Eventst × InstEventst−1 → 2
B
A Declarative Electronic Institution assigns a Boolean on the acceptance on
the aggregation of some Events at time t depending on the previous ones.
Generalizing:
DEIt =
−→
SD : Events→ B
A Declarative Electronic Institutions determines the acceptance of some
Events.
4 Coherent Social Inclusion
4.1 Coherent Social Inclusion Problem
For a Social Universe SU = 〈A,S, SIP 〉 where there exist A, the set of all agents
ai in SU , a set of Society functions
−→
S such that
−→
S : A→ 2A, and a set of Social
Inclusion Problems SIPn in n dimensions, such that the i-th problem:
SIPi = 〈SP,
−→
SU, T, SDP, P,
−→
SP ,
−→
SD〉
where:
A Social Power order SP between Socities calculated by the Social Utility
−→
SU as the weighted average Utility (of presumed traits) of all the agents in the
Society, T is the set of all presumed traits of the set of agents A. SDP is the set of
Social Discrimination Profile functions in n dimensions over T for all the agents
in A. P is the set of all preferences p in SIP .
−→
SP is the Selected Preferences
function such that
−→
SP : P → 2P ;namely the subset of preferences taken into
account for preference aggregation. Finally,
−→
SDn is the Social Discrimination
function over P in n dimensions, such that SDn : P → R
n
The Social Discrimination Profile functions SDP are discrimination estima-
tions agreed upon previously over the Social Roles of a Society. Namely, they
are a set of vectors
−→
d in the Social Discrimination Space.
As for agency, an agent a ∈ A:
Ai = 〈Ti, SDPi,
−→
K i,
−→
Pi, PDi〉
where ti is the trait t of agent i; Ti is the set of all the traits of agent i, where
−→
U i ∈ Ti is the Social Utility trait for agent i, SDP
n
i is the Social Discrimination
Profile function of agent i in n dimensions, such that SDPni : Ti → R
n. Moreover,
Ki is the (Possible and Coherent) Preference Knowledge of agent i such that
Ki : P ×
−→
SD → 2P × 2
−−→
PDn
i where each PDni is a Preference Discrimination
function of agent i in n dimensions such that
−−→
PDni :
−→
Pi × P → R
n; pi is the
preference p of agent i. Subsequently,
−→
Pi is the Preference function of agent i
such that
−→
Pi :
−→
K i × P → 2
P .
4.2 One-stage Approval Voting
−−−→
CSI1 is the One-stage Coherent Social Inclusion function for a Society such
that maximizes the set of agents such that there exist a Inclusive Multi-winner
Selection Rule function:
IMWSR : A×
−→
S × SIPni → CSIS
where CSIS is the Coherent Social Inclusion Society such that maximises the
number of agents belonging to S such that
∀ai ∈
−→
S (A), ∀Ti :
−−−→
SDP (Ti) = argmin
−→
SD(P )
.
That is, we would like to maximize the number of agents with the minimum
traits being discriminated for. For the calculation of this One-stage Coherent
Social inclusion function, we firstly apply the Adaptive Coordinate Descent al-
gorithm to find a set of less socially discriminatory all the preferences P, and
then we apply the one-stage of the Approval Voting system where we maximize
the number of winners with no trait being discriminated for.
4.3 Two-stage Approval Voting
Preference Number Maximization
−−−→
CSI2 is the Two stage Coherent Social
Inclusion function for a Society such that maximizes the set of agents such that
there exist a Inclusive Multi-winner Selection Rule function:
IMWSR : A×
−→
S × SIPni → CSIS
where CSIS is the Coherent Social Inclusion Society such that maximises the
number of agents belonging to S such that:
Stage one
Stage1 = MWSR1(P )
Stage two
∀ai ∈
−→
S (A), ∀Ti :
−−−→
SDP (Ti) = argmin
−→
SD(Stage1)
.
That is, we would like to maximize the number of agents with the minimum
traits being discriminated for. For the calculation of this Coherent Social inclu-
sion function, we firstly use a Multiple Winner Selection Rule, MWSR1, on all
preferences P . Then we apply the Adaptive Coordinate Descent algorithm and
MWSR2, namely the Multi-Winner Selection Rules of the second stage to find
a set of less socially discriminatory winning preferences.
Preference Aggregation: Social Choice Optimization in Policy-making.
Assuming a Society already exists and starts with a Coherent Inclusion Problem
and minimum set of norms including a Coherent Social Inclusion function, one
could assume that if the norms are already Socially Coherent, namely, they
minimize the discrimination of the Society. Then the objective is to apply the
Coherent Social Inclusion function to add new preferred norms that continues
coherently including the whole society.
−−−−−−→
PACSI2 is the Two-stage Preference Aggregation Coherent Social Inclusion
function for a Society such that maximizes the set of agents such that there exist
a Inclusive Multi-winner Selection Rule function:
IMWSR : A×
−→
S × SIPni → CSIS
where CSIS is the Coherent Social Inclusion Society such that maximises the
number of agents belonging to S such that:
Stage one
Stage1 = MWSR(
−→
SP (P ))
Stage two
∀ai ∈
−→
S (A), ∀Ti :
−−−→
SDP (Ti) = argmin
−→
SD(Stage1)
.
That is, we would like to maximize the number of agents with the minimum
traits being discriminated for. For the calculation of this Coherent Social in-
clusion function, we firstly use a Multiple Winner Selection Rule, MWSR, on
a subset of all preferences
−→
SP (P ), to start with the aggregation process. As it
should return a coherent subset, even a random subset might be used to start
the initialization process. Then we apply the Adaptive Coordinate Descent algo-
rithm and the second-stage MWSR2 to find a set of less socially discriminatory
winning preferences. For this, once found the less discriminatory goal(s) as the
single-peak preference(s) we then may find the shortest path(s) in
−→
SD, a graph
with a multi-dimensional discrimination function in each edge. In order to do
this, each cost in the graph can be calculated by the application of the dis-
crimination function from vertex to vertex. With the shortest path(s), i.e. the
optimum (set of) single-peaked preferences, we may now apply the second vot-
ing stage (possibly categorised by each path of the set) to find the k-Coherent
Optimum Preferences to aggregate.
5 Conclusions
In this paper is I have introduced Social Choice Optimisation as a generalisation
of Two-stage Approval Voting (TAV) where there is a maximization stage and
a minimization stage implementing thus a Minimax, a well-known Artificial In-
telligence decision-making rule to minimize hindering towards a (Social) Goal.
Secondly, I have presented, following my Open Standardization and Open Inte-
gration Methodology (in refinement process) I put in practice in my dissertation
[1], the Open Standardization of Social Inclusion, as a global social goal of So-
cial Choice Optimization. Any type of constraint in the Social Universe (either
physical, normative, moral, ethic, etc) are implicitly generalized in the Social
Discrimination function.
As for the Open Standardization of Social Inclusion, I started with a open
consensus between Adaptive Coordinate descent and propositional Coherence
Theory, extending the latter for the functional case. Then I continued towards
an open integration of both approaches introducing the Coherent Social Inclu-
sion Problem. Finally, I provided an algorithm for the One-stage Approval Voting
(OAV) and two for the Two-stage Approval Voting (TAV), namely, Preference
Number Maximization (PNM) and Preference Aggregation (PA). PNM is useful
for tackling the overall known problem, but is NP-hard in the uncertain case as
it is a generalisation of the Travelling Salesman Problem for continuous Halmil-
tonian Paths. Let me argue this statement. Adaptive Coordinate Descent is a
generalisation of Gradient Descent which in turn it is a generalisation of Hill
Climbing. That is my point, imagine that you and some other strangers got
kidnapped and left unconscious in the middle of a mountain. Let also assume,
that you want to reach a peak to see where are you in order to continue with
the escape plan. (Rolling downwards is obviously disregarded). In that case, you
might want to follow the most gradual and feasible path minimising the distance
walked too. Having a bit of knowledge of the mentioned mountain or having a
map would equal to finding the gradual shortest path. However, without any
knowledge of the mountain, only with an intuition about the goal, you and your
luckily friendly partners should arrive to a consensus in which paths to follow at
any bifurcation. One heuristic would be to analyse a subset of all the possible
paths, choose the k-gradual and feasible paths and vote the final solution. That
would be Coherent Social Inclusion: the Less-discriminating Majority Winner
Selection Rule (LDM-WSR).
6 Future Work
The main goal of this paper is that LDM−WSR, namely the Less-discriminating
Majority Winner Selection Rule (LDM − WSR) would be included in each
Constitution, i.e. each core of constitutive rules establishing the basis of every
(Human) Society.
For the time being, Social Choice Optimization opens new opportunities for
multidisciplinary research: from theoretical to applications in almost every field
of Knowledge, going through all the possibilities in between as I would briefly
introduce.
6.1 Preferences over Social Discrimination functions
The Coherent Social Inclusion Problem CSIP is recursive by nature: agents need
to Coherently Agree in a Social Discrimination function first. So the General
Problem is: Could we arrive to agreements on our Preferences over the Agreed
Social Discrimination function? A feasible solution to kick-start the method
is to apply the method over Preferences over Social Discrimination functions
based on current Social Discrimination functions: the definition of our States,
Constitutions, and so on.
6.2 Abstraction and Aggregation in Lp→+∞
Defining a computer program, norm, constraint solving and so on is finding and
constructing a function in the Lebesgue space Lp. By defining the Social Dis-
crimination function as a functional abstraction in Lebesgue space opens the
research path of Computational Abstraction (definition, formalisation, charac-
terization, implementation. . .), maybe be as functions in hyper-connected L+∞
Domains, involving all the Artificial Intelligence fields: Logics, Reasoning, Learn-
ing, Multi-agent Systems, Declarative Mechanism Design, and so on.
As a starting point, functions in different Domains (topics) define a new
super-domain. Thus, I refer to super-domains created by two functions created
with Lambda calculus. Then, recursively, using Lambda Calculus of two (or
more) of these super-domains, and so on. I would name these two Lambda cal-
culus of super-domains: Standardization and Integration.
6.3 Characterization of Social Choice Optimization
Starting in a top-down approach, I would mention than the most prominent the-
oretical research path would be the formalization of Social Choice Optimization
properties. From checking what paradoxes apply and how much Condorcet Effi-
cient would be. I followed a Hill climbing (citation following) approach starting
from [8] to [3] and the path has been at least interesting.
6.4 Improving Coherent Social Inclusion
Learning Social Discrimination Profile The Social Discrimination Profile
functions SDP are discrimination estimations agreed upon previously over the
Social Role of a Society. I have assumed than Discrimination may be analysed
quantitatively. However, this is still an ongoing research path as [9] and [10]
present. This poses the next research question: Could Regulated Deep Learning
[7] learn a discrimination function from empirical tests?
Relaxing the number of traits and social profiles being discriminated
In the One-stage Approval Voting algorithm for Coherent Social Inclusion, all
the preferences of the Social Universe are taken into account. One research path
would be characterizing and proposing solutions for the relaxed case where the
number of traits, or social profiles, being discriminated is not an empty set.
6.5 Collaborative Knowledge Exploration
Continuing with the Mountain Exploration metaphor, where I assumed all the
kidnapped members of the Society are together in the same point of the Moun-
tain and must remain together. Let me then assume a variation where the agents
are scattered all over the Mountain, namely Discrimination Space. Then, one
could start assuming that there exist Free Communication and the global (and
common) social goal of everyone reaching at the highest peak, is maintained.
These opens the following possibilities too:
Uncertainty in the Social Discrimination Space In the Coherent Social
Inclusion Problem presented at the beginning of section 4 there were additional
definitions such as
−−→
PD. It was left on purpose to make noticeable the case where
the Social Discrimination Function, the map
−→
SD of the mountain
︷︸︸︷
DS (the Social
Discrimination Space), is not completely known in advance. Thus, it would re-
quire to coherently and iteratively aggregating Preference Discrimination Func-
tions of agents, namely, some
−−→
PDi for all agent i.
One tentative solution involving Regulated Deep Learning would be using
PA in a Regulated Learning phase, and employ concurrently PA in a Regulated
Decision phase, as the one presented in section 4 for establishing the Inclusive
and Coherent Preference Agreements under Partial Uncertainty.
Assuming Agent Rationality and Will Following the extra definitions, we
may find
−→
K i the (Possible and Coherent) Knowledge function over a set of
preferences Pi and a set of Preference Discrimination functions PDi for agent
i. We may define and implement the Agent Preferences function Ki strategi-
cally following a Game Theory approach, dividing the Strategic Preference (and
Preference Discrimination) Selection problem in possibly continuous steps, like
continuous time.
Preference Derogation: Coherent Backtracking When dealing with Un-
certainty and Local Minima, it might be necessary to remove some previously
agreed preferences and continue with the Aggregation process. It would be ex-
tremely useful in a Policy-making scenario.
6.6 Implementing Coherent Social Inclusion in Declarative
Mechanism Design.
Following the work from [7] on Declarative Mechanism Design, where I is im-
proved, the author expects to start the Open Integration of Coherent Social
Inclusion in the fore-mentioned Regulated Middleware.
Furthermore, the work presented previously in [1] has been tested in the
Electronic Institutions (EIs) Middleware presented in [11] that runs over JADE
[12]. Nonetheless, the author expects to add the language to a newly developed
Middleware, as it is capable of give Operational Semantics, i.e run, a Declar-
ative version of EI protocols as it was shown in [1]. The main advantage of a
Declarative version is that it might be provided to Software Agents as the rules-
of-the-game in order to coordinate, e.g, using Social DCOPs [13], AMODCOPs
[14] or Game Theory.
6.7 Improving Game Theory
From the complete implementation of Declarative Electronic Institutions found
in [1] we have just used one Activity, a Metamorphic Game, i.e. a game whose
rules may vary with time, action (or inaction) of agents, or other normative
notions. To the best of my knowledge there are several types of Games not
formalised yet in order to fully coordinate agents in a Declarative (Complete)
Electronic Institution. Thus, there might be a need to formalise Hierarchical Con-
current Metamorphic Game Theory. However, following the Divide-and-Conquer
methodology a first attempt of roadmap would be in the inverse order:
Metamorphic⇒ Concurrent⇒ Hierarchical
Metamorphic⇒ Concurrent Metamorphic
Concurrent Metamorphic⇒
Hierarchical Concurrent Metamorphic
Then, it would reasonable to study their interrelationships, thus creating
Declarative Meta-Games, as the computable with the Declarative Electronic
Institutions tested.
6.8 Full-Hybrid Artificial Intelligence
However, using I as an Programmable Event-based Middle-ware opens new
paths of research as it uses Hybrid AI (ı.e. mixes Autonomous Agents and Multi-
agents Systems, Machine Learning, and Symbolic Programming). Furthermore,
one of the main applications of Hybrid AI is in its own a whole new AI subfield,
namely, Artificial Teaching.
6.9 Artificial Teaching
The whole concept of Artificial Teaching is recent, and not properly defined
yet. There are some mentions in the literature that I will not cite in order to
engage the reader to improve the previous lines and the proposed concepts luckily
exposing her results on subsequent articles. For a sample, the reader may check
ongoing research in [15] and [16].
In my humble opinion, in the research path towards General AI there are
several Problem-specific milestones to reach in every sub-field of AI; and mim-
icking Human Intelligence and Evolution, it may seem a natural step forward to
add the teaching capability to artificial learners to decrease complexity.
Please imagine a researcher (agent) being in a continuous ”Deep... and deep...
and deep... and very deep... Learning” process since the beginning of its exis-
tence. To the best of my knowledge, there are very few (human) researchers
(honestly, almost none) that self-learned everything on his own, with no inter-
action with others who may have taught him something, even involuntarily, and
this happens almost every day as a Spanish proverb well says.
6.10 Collaborative Knowledge Evolution
Sumarizing my main goal as Collaborative Knowledge Evolution, it could be
seen as the Open Standardization and Integration of Open Knowledge optimized
from generation to generation thanks to (Human) Evolution. With this, I want to
emphasize the role of (Human and Artificial; Physical and Software) Teachers in
Collaborative Learning and (Collaborative) Research, and thus in Collaborative
Knowledge Evolution. Luckily, in a future we would be a step closer to General
AI, by means of Collaborative Optimisation, achieving thus a full integration and
consensus of researchers (and their contributions, either Physical or Software),
even they are not collaborating on purpose. And all these thanks to Regulated
Middle-wares and Artificial Mediators.
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